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Abstract: The introduction of biometric technology has resulted in a
significant shift, which defies tradition and some of the very values that
we cherish as a society. Additionally, there have been numerous recent
developments, which have facilitated a fundamental global reassessment of the safety and security needs of our communities. Other
challenges, like the delivery of government-granted social services, have
resulted in governments looking for ways to ensure entitlement prior to
the provision of finite resources to individuals.
As technology is increasing in sophistication, it is being deployed in
novel and creative ways to meet some of these new demands. However,
where technology collides with individual rights and freedoms, we are
required to examine the utilization of technologies to determine
whether the use is proportionate to the alleged benefits. We are similarly
compelled to decide whether there are less intrusive means to achieving
the stated ends. This inquiry is even more relevant in the face of the
new, seemingly global employment of biometric technology and the
rationale behind governments developing dependence on this new
machinery.
This paper will examine (i) what biometric technology is; (ii) why it has
become so popular; (iii) how biometric technology is being applied in
every day use; and, (iv) the advantages and disadvantages of biometric
technology. This assessment will occur in the context of the impact that
this new technology is having on privacy and the privacy rights of
individuals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Changes, and the challenges that they often bring with them,
sometimes result in a significant shift in the way that things have
historically been done. When new technology is factored into this
equation, the outcome can be a massive transformation, which
defies not just tradition but also some of the very values that we
cherish as a society.
There have been numerous developments recently, which, have
resulted in a fundamental global re-assessment of the safety and
security needs of our communities. Other challenges, like the
delivery of government-granted social services, have resulted in
governments looking for ways to ensure entitlement prior to the
provision finite resources to individuals.
As technology is increasing in sophistication, it is being deployed
in novel and creative ways to meet some of these new demands.
However, where technology collides with individual rights and
freedoms, we are required to examine the use of technologies to
determine whether the use is proportionate to the alleged benefits.
We are similarly compelled to decide whether there is a less
intrusive means of achieving the stated ends. This inquiry is even
more relevant in the face of the new, seemingly global
employment of biometric technology and the rationale behind
governments developing dependence on this new machinery. It is
incontrovertible that this is the new future – what is not clear is
whether biometric technology is a panacea or a placebo for the
current maladies of society.
This paper will examine (I) what biometric technology is; (II) why
it has become so popular; (III) how biometric technology is being
applied in every day use; and, (IV) the advantages and
disadvantages of biometric technology. This assessment will occur
in the context of the impact that this new technology is having on
privacy and the privacy rights of individuals.
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I.1 WHAT ARE BIOMETRICS
Biometrics have been described as “the science of identifying
people based on their physiological and behavioural
characteristics.”1 Other commentators have defined biometric
technology as “generating a readable body: it transforms the body’s
surfaces and characteristics into digital codes and ciphers to be
‘read’ by a machine.”2 Still others contend that “biometrics are
automated methods used to recognize people based on behavioural
characteristics.
Biometrics
uses
immutable
personal
characteristics, such as facial features, fingerprints, and retinal
patterns, to establish and authenticate identity.3
For the purposes of this paper, biometrics will be defined as
referring to “the measurement and analysis of unique physical or
behavioural characteristics (as fingerprints or voice patterns)
especially as a means of verifying personal identity.”4 The
emphasis here is on the utilization of an individual’s unique,
immutable physical characteristics as a means of verifying an
identity or identifying someone who is unknown.
According to Kamini Bharvada, “verification involves confirming
or denying a person’s claimed identity and identification is where
one has to establish a person’s identity.”5
Identification
verification process works by comparing two biometric
representations, “usually called ‘templates,’ and decide whether

1

Robin Feldman, ‘Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of
Biometric Technology,’ 2003, 25 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J., p.1.
2
Irma van der Ploeg, ‘The Illegal Body: ‘Eurodac’ and the Politics of Biometric
Identification,’ 1999, Ethics and Information Technology, 1: p.1.
3
Mark G. Milone, ‘Biometric Surveillance: Searching for Identity,’ 2001, 57
Bus. Law, p.1.
4
Merriam Webster, Collegiate Dictionary, 11th Ed., (Merriam Webster Inc.,
Massachusetts, 2003).
5
Kamini Bharvada, ‘Electronic Signatures, Biometrics and PKI in the UK,’ 2002,
International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, 16(3), p.270.
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they are the same or not.”6 This is referred to as a one-to-one
match and is used to allow specific individuals who have preauthorized access, admission. According to Tomko’s example of a
bank machine, a one-to-one search may be
Used when we are accessing such things as our bank
machine….we want some form of control to serve as a
gateway to let you and only you in, and keep all others
out. In these activities though, we are not searching a
database to identify you. We are actually authenticating
7
your eligibility to access the bank machine.

By contrast, a “one-to-many” search “requires the system to read a
person’s biometrics and scan a large database to find a match.”8
This search “compares a specimen to large number of stored
templates and checks whether the database contains a matching
one.”9 This investigation is typically used when the individual’s
identity is unknown and their biometric template is compared
against a database of other similar templates. Tomko asserts that
“in all cases, your fingerprint pattern, or a derivative of that
pattern is stored in a database file and the one-to-many search
strategy is an identification process.”10
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) states that “all
biometric technology systems have certain aspects in common.
All are dependent upon an accurate reference or “registration”
sample. If a biometric system is to identify a person, it must first
have this sample positively linked to the subject, to compare

6

Irma van der Ploeg, ‘Biometrics and Privacy: A Note on the Politics of Theorizing
Technology,’ Information, Communication & Society,’ 2003, 6:1, p.86.
7
Dr. George Tomko, ‘Biometrics as a Privacy-Enhancing Technology: Friend or Foe of
Privacy?’ Presented at the Privacy Laws & Business 9th Privacy Commissioners’/Data
Protection Authorities Workshop, 1998, Online:
<http://www.dss.state.ct.us/digital/tomko.htm>, p.2.
8
Supra, note 1, p.2.
9
Supra, note 6, p.86.
10
Supra, note 7, p.2.
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against.”11 The EFF further suggests that “modern biometric
identification systems, based on digital technology, analyze
personal physical attributes at the time of registration and distil
them into a series of numbers. Once this reference sample is in the
system, future attempts to identify a person are based on a
comparison of a “live” sample and the reference sample or
samples.”12 The registration requirement is essential regardless of
type of biometric being utilized. There are many different systems
currently being used with additional structures under
development. As a result, a review of some of the current
biometric technology may help to clarify the importance of the
enrolment process.
I.2 FINGERPRINTING
According to the EFF, fingerprinting is a highly familiar and wellestablished biometric science.
The traditional use of
fingerprinting, of course, has been as a forensic criminological
technique, used to identify perpetrators…this comparison uses the
unique features of any given fingerprint, including its overall
shape, and pattern of ridges, valleys, and their bifurcations and
terminations to establish the identity of the perpetrator.”13 The
EFF claims that with “modern biometrics, these features called
fingerprint minutiae, can be captured, analyzed, and compared
electronically, with correlations drawn between a live sample and
a referenced sample, as with other biometric technologies.”14
Bharvada asserts that “fingerprints are the most widely used
biometric and have the advantage of being cheaper and simpler
than most other biometrics. They are of course useful to combat

11

Electronic Frontier Foundation, ‘Biometrics: Who’s Watching You?,’ Online:
Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<http://www.eff.org/privacy/surveillance/biometrics>, p.7.
12
Ibid., p.7.
13
Supra, note 11, p.10.
14
Ibid., p.10.
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identity fraud…”15 However, while fingerprints are regarded as
reliable, changing only in size with age, being highly resistant to
modification or injury and difficult to forge,16 there is a certain
stigma that is attached to the use of fingerprints due to their
lengthy association with criminals and crime. As a result, people
may be less inclined to willingly participate in systems, which use
this technology and any discussions around fingerprinting social
assistance recipients or asylum seekers invariably meets with
resistance.
I.3 HAND GEOMETRY
According to Feldman, “hand geometry technology creates
mathematical pattern abstractions using data derived from the
length, width, thickness, curvature and surface area of the hand
and four fingers. The quality of the enrolment image will affect
how often the system falsely rejects the individual in the
future…”17
The EFF contends that hand geometry is “the most ubiquitous
electronic biometric system.”18
The hand geometry-based systems require the subject to
place his or her hand (usually the right hand) on a plate
where it is photographically captured and measured…the
human hand presents a sufficiently peculiar conformation
of anatomical features to enable authentication, but is not
considered
sufficiently
unique
to
provide
full
identification….a simple hand geometry system will
measure length and thickness of digits, width of the palm
at various points and the radius of the palm. This results

15

Supra, note 5, p.269.
Supra, note 11, p.10.
17
Supra, note 1, p.4.
18
Supra, note 11, p.9.
16
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in a relatively simple identification that can be expressed
19
in a very simple, compact string of data.

The EFF asserts that with respect to the deployment of
“traditional hand geometry systems, they have typically found
acceptance in applications requiring verification of an identity,
rather than a full proof or establishment of an identity.”20 These
are characteristically situations where an individual is
endeavouring “to prove or disprove their membership in a
relatively small group of people...”21 However, “when the stakes
are high, these systems are not relied on exclusively to confirm
identity; rather they are used to provide an additional layer of
security above and beyond… existing security systems.” 22
I.4 IRIS AND RETINA SCANNING
The human eye is believed to present “two features with excellent
properties for identification. Both the iris (the coloured part visible
at the front of the eye) and the veins of the retina (the thin film of
nerve endings inside the eyeball that capture light and send it back
to your brain) provide patterns that can uniquely identify an
individual.”23
Of the two, “retinal scanning is the older technology, and requires
the subject to look into a reticle and focus on a visible target while
the scan is completed.”24 The purpose of this scan is to allow the
system to “analyze the patterns of veins occurring in the back of
the eye.”25 Naturally, its regarded as “one of the more intrusive

19

Ibid., p.9.
Supra, note 11, p.10.
21
Ibid, p.10.
22
Supra, note 11, p.10.
23
Ibid, p.11.
24
Supra, note 11, p.10.
25
Supra, note 1, p.4.
20
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biometric technologies, with some subjects reporting discomfort
at the scanning method.” 26
By way of contrast, the iris scan “uses an infrared light to identify
and create mathematical abstractions of patterns in the coloured
tissue around the centre of the eye.”27 The “pattern of lines and
colours on the eye are…analyzed, digitized and compared against a
reference sample for verification.”28 According to the EFF, the iris
recognition has an advantage in ease of use, in that it merely
requires the subject to look at a camera from a distance of three to
ten inches.29
Finally, iris scanners are considered by some to be “by far the most
reliable biometric, but relatively expensive.”30 However, to their
merit, “iris scans are painless and can be carried out without the
subject even noticing.”31 Of course, this illustrates one of the
privacy concerns of opponents of this technology.
I.5 FACIAL RECOGNITION
The EFF maintains that facial recognition sprung into the national
spotlight during the 2001 Super Bowl, when Tampa police scanned
the faces of game fans without their knowledge for the purpose of
spotting terrorists in the crowd. Facial recognition remains one of
the more controversial biometric technologies because of its very
unobtrusiveness. With good cameras and good lighting, a facial
recognition system can sample faces from tremendous distances
without the subject’s knowledge or consent.32

26

Supra, note 11, p.11.
Supra, note 1, p.5.
28
Supra, note 11, p.11.
29
Ibid., p.11.
30
Supra, note 5, p.270.
31
Ibid., p.270.
32
Supra, note 11, p.11.
27
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According to Susan McCoy, “the fundamental principle behind
facial recognition technology is that each person’s face can be
numerically coded and then compared to a database of thousands
of other identities of either known criminals or authorized
personnel, in nearly real-time.”33 The EFF states that
Most facial recognition technology works by one of two
methods: facial geometry or eigenface comparison. Facial
geometry analysis works by taking a known reference
point (for example, the distance from eye to eye), and
measuring the various features of the face in their distance
and angles from this reference point.
Eigenface
comparison uses a palette of about 150 facial abstractions,
and compares the captured face with these archetypal
34
abstract faces.

According to Bridget Mallon, the technology was formulated in
the early 1990’s as a U.S. Department of Defence initiative called
the FERET program. The program was designed to determine
whether it would be possible to use algorithms accurately to
measure human faces…. the program concluded in 1998, with
private corporations waiting anxiously to capitalize on the new
technology.35 These companies are now in the business of
supplying, operating and maintaining this technology for
governments and the private sector for use in “public” places.
Bharvada suggests that “facial recognition technology is becoming
more widespread because it can exploit existing cameras and
databases for facial images from driving licences and passports.
Further, unlike other biometrics, facial recognition can operate

33

Susan McCoy, ‘O Big Brother Where Art Thou? The Constitutional Use of
Facial Recognition Technology,’ 2002, 20 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.,
p.2.
34
Supra, note 11, p.11.
35
Bridget Mallon, ‘ “Every Breath You Take, Every Move You Make, I’ll Be
Watching You,” The Use of Face Recognition Technology,’ 2003, 48 Vill. L.
Rev., p.2.
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passively, without people realizing that they are being scanned.”36
There is something about the covertness of this surveillance that
occurs without the knowledge or consent of the subjects, that
causes the greatest concern and objection of opponents of this
technology.
I.6 OTHER ALTERNATIVES
While the discussion thus far has focused on some of the more
predominant biometric technology in use, there are some other
developments in this field, which are briefly notable. Voice
verification is thought to offer an interesting possibility because it
works by analysing an individual’s fundamental vocal
characteristics.37 The premise is that it would allow remote
identification using a phone system, an infrastructure that is
already in existence and therefore has zero client side costs.38
However, voice verification systems are required to account for
more variables than other systems such as the compression of a
voice captured by cheap microphones like the kind found on
phone handsets, background noise and other artefacts. Other
problems include the tremendous variability of the human voice
due to colds, aging and fatigue.39 Naturally, there are serious
issues around the reliability of this technology.
Finally, according to Bharvada, there are a series of other biometric
techniques currently under development, which are noteworthy.
Some of these new technologies include analyzing “the sound
emitted from the vibration of our major organs and even body
odour recognition.”40 It is unlikely that these will be in general
public use in the near future but it would certainly be interesting

36

Supra, note 5, p.270.
Ibid., p.270.
38
Supra, note 11, p.11.
39
Ibid., p.12.
40
Supra, note 5, p.270.
37
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to see the technology that would have to be developed for the
registration, capture and analysis of such new techniques.

II. WHY HAVE BIOMETRICS BECOME SO POPULAR
Biometric technology has received significant attention in the last
few years and its application in every day use has become
considerably more common recently. However, the explanations
for this development seem to vary with commentators identifying
diverging reasons for this expansion.
II.1 SEPTEMBER 11
According to the EFF, the renewed attention to biometric
technology is one of the many reactions to the September 11
tragedy.41 Mallon asserts that “as a result of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, airports and cities across the country are
looking to use new technology to regain a level of safety and
security that seems to have been lost. As a result, the biometric
industry as a whole, as experienced unprecedented growth over the
past few years.”42
Van der Ploeg adds that “following the events of September
Eleventh these security needs have been elevated everywhere to
the highest priority level, resulting in a strong push towards hightech solutions.43
II.2 SOCIAL SERVICES ENTITLEMENT
Another reason for the expanding demand for biometric
technology comes from the social services sector. Van der Ploeg
suggests that “one of the principal domains in which experiments

41

Supra, note 11, p.1.
Supra, note 35, p.8.
43
Supra, note 6, p.86.
42
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with biometrics are being conducted are departments in charge of
social assistance and welfare programs in countries like the USA,
Canada, Spain and the Netherlands, which are launching programs
for detecting and preventing so-called double-dipping.”44 “Doubledipping” is described as “a kind of fraud that involves the
collection of more benefits than one is entitled to, by entering the
program under two or more identities. A wide consensus appears
to exist concerning the high levels of this type of fraud, and hence
concerning the urgency of the need for new identification
practices.”45
According to the EFF, “even prior to September 11…large scale
civilian biometric identification systems were being pushed.”46 In
the U.S., both “the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of (1995)…, a welfare reform law, and the
Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act (1996),…
an immigration reform law, called for the use of “technology” for
identification purposes.”47
II.3 IDENTITY FRAUD
A related problem to double dipping, which is becoming a
widespread predicament beyond the multiple identities used in the
social services or immigration context, is the issue of identity
theft. Tomko asserts that “identity fraud… is a growth industry.
Biometrics are being viewed as a solution to identity fraud because
they can be used, not only to positively authenticate, but if one
wants, also to track individuals and their transactions.”48 While
authentication is certainly a reasonable goal, the ability to be able
to track individuals and their transactions adds a level of scrutiny
and surveillance that is deeply disconcerting.

44

Ibid., p.86.
Supra, note 6, p.86.
46
Supra, note 11, p.3.
47
Ibid., p.3.
48
Supra, note 7, p.3.
45
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Another development which existed before September Eleventh,
but which has significantly increased since, is a heightened
government demand to identify individuals attempting to enter a
national border. Nowhere is this more evident than in countries
like the U.K. and in particular, the U.S. According to Neda Matar,
“using secure identification may also mean preventing national
crises. Our need to identify those who enter the United States,
manage those who overstay their welcome, and be alerted to
terrorist-like patterns of activity has taken on a new level of
urgency.”49
II.4 TRAVEL EFFICIENCY
Mark Milone suggests that the need for accurate and efficient
verification of identity has led to the demand for biometric
technology. “Biometrics provide the potential for improved
security that is particularly important in the international travel
context. It allows for stronger access control and strengthened
document integrity. Biometrics are also promising in terms of
facilitating travel.”50 Biometrically enhanced procedures are
believed to enable more efficient border crossings for pre-cleared
frequent travellers.
II.5 IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM SEEKERS
At the other end of the border-protection spectrum is the
increasing demand to better identify visitors who enter a country
under the pretence of study, those seeking asylum or individuals
who have managed to overstay their visits. The U.K. is extremely
concerned with processing legitimate asylum seekers and the
Home Office has been working to introduce a smart card
Application Registration Card for asylum seekers, which would

49

Neda Matar, ‘Are You Ready for a National ID Card? Perhaps We Don’t Have
to Choose Between Fear of Terrorism and Need for Privacy,’ 2003, 17 Emory
Int’l. L. Rev., p.11.
50
Supra, note 3, p.2.
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contain fingerprint data. Recent reports indicate that this system
is “already going live, and could be said to undercut one of the
objectives floated for an ID card, the proof by asylum seekers of
entitlement to health service treatment.”51 With health care and
other social services resources being extremely limited, the British
government is particularly concerned with people claiming asylum
simply to access free health care services, at the expense of British
citizens.52
II.6 ANONYMOUS TRANSACTIONS
Finally, with the advent of new technology such as the Internet,
digital communications and the global development of ecommerce transactions, business dealings are becoming more
anonymous than ever before. According to van der Ploeg,
With the rapid proliferation of information technologies,
data processing, electronic transactions and service
delivery affecting everyday life in multiple ways a strong
need for new identification practices has emerged. In
numerous contexts, technologically mediated and
automated economic and social interaction replaces
physical and face-to-face encounters, depriving interacting
partners of traditional, trusted ways of establishing to each
53
other who they are.

Due to the growing number of online transactions, merchants are
never actually meeting with their customer and have no way of

51

The Register, ‘Smart Cards, ID Cards, Nice, Nasty, Inevitable?,’ by John
Lettice, 4th August, 2003, Online:
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/08/04/smart_cards_id_cards_nice>, p.2.
(Last accessed on 9 August 2004).
52
BBC News, UK Edition, ‘Health Tourism Rules Unveiled,’ 30 December 2003,
Online: BBC <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3355751.stm>; BBC News, UK
Edition, ‘Tories Target ‘Health Tourism’,’ 1 June 2003, Online: BBC
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2954438.stm>.
(Last accessed on 14 August 2004).
53
Supra, note 6, p.86.
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verifying the identity of their purchaser. This invariably leads to
serious trust and security issues, and the potential for fraud and
identity theft.
Additionally, Bharvada asserts that “the movement to open
network communication systems, such as the Internet poses
significant challenges to implementation of a global electronic
trading system. Among the most significant concerns are those
pertaining to security of the information involved, that is,
confidentiality, trust, integrity and availability. The reduction of
the risk of fraud and unauthorized access is vital to enable
electronic commerce to truly expand on a global scale.”54
While security is essential to fostering a flourishing electronic
commerce environment, it does not go far enough to resolving the
issue of the anonymity of the consumer. Biometrics are being
touted as the leading solution to the problem of authenticating the
identity of the unknown consumer. However, the issue of how and
where these new biometric technologies are being deployed is
essential to developing a more complete understanding of the
technology before examining the advantages and disadvantages
that they may pose in relation to privacy.

III. APPLICATIONS OF BIOMETRICS INTO EVERYDAY USE
Biometrics are now being used or deliberated upon for use in a
variety of applications. Where a particular biometric is utilized
will be contingent on the expense associated with the technology
and the relative significance of the place where the technology is
being considered for deployment. An examination of how this
technology is being employed is important in order to better
comprehend the areas which are regarded by government and the

54

Supra, note 5, p.266.
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private sector as posing a more serious threat which justifies the
expenditure for additional security.
Various biometric technologies are being employed in the
protection of open and public spaces. Examples of spaces where
biometrics are being utilized would include airports, secured
buildings which accommodate the government and the private
sector, casinos, sporting events and other large open places.
According to a recent newspaper report, fingerprint technology
appears to still be the technology of choice in certain shopping
areas and airports in England.
Shops in Bracknell, Houslow and other locations around
the UK are beginning to experiment with a thumbprint
signature scheme requiring customers who pay by cheque
to provide a thumbprint as an extra precaution against
fraud. London City Airport secures its staff areas with a
photo ID pass with a fingerprint embedded in it, which
acts as both an ID card and access control card for its 1,600
55
employees.

By comparison, Philip Agre confirms that the use of facial
recognition systems in the public came to public attention when it
emerged that fans attending the Super Bowl had unknowingly
been matched against a database of alleged criminals, and when
the city of Tampa deployed a face-recognition system in the
nightlife district of Ybor City.56 It is interesting to note that in the
case of the Super Bowl, spectators were unaware that their faces
were being scanned. By comparison, “as people walk down the
streets of Tampa, Florida’s historic Ybor City, they are greeted by

55

The Independent (London), ‘Ever Feel You’re Being Watched?; Whether You’re
Travelling, Shopping, or on the Way to Work, Your Eyes Have it,’ 13 August,
2003, p.1.
56
Philip E. Agre, ‘Your Face is Not a Bar Code: Arguments Against Automatic
Face Recognition in Public Places,’ 2003, Online:
<http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/pagre/bar-code.html>, p.1.
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signs stating “Area Under Video Monitoring.”57 Informing people
that an area is under surveillance re-empowers individuals,
permitting them to make a more fully informed decision about
whether they wish to attend an area that is being monitored. This
is a significantly different situation from where surveillance is
occurring surreptitiously.
According to Mallon, the U.S. is not the only country utilizing
facial recognition systems. “England was one of the first nations to
capitalize on this new technology. Since the fall of 1998, Newham
England, a borough of London, began monitoring its citizens with
the same face recognition system as used at the Super Bowl….
British officials were so impressed with the new technology that
they announced a plan in 2000 to expand its use. They expect to
install almost two million cameras across the country to aid law
enforcement officials.”58 In a recent article, the estimated number
of cameras currently deployed across Britain is 4.2 million.59 While
its true that not all of these cameras will be utilized for facial
recognition systems, the front-end technology is certainly in place
for widespread deployment when, not if, the government decides
to implement its use more broadly.
As previously mentioned, biometrics are also being deployed in
the social services sector as “double-dipping” and welfare fraud are
growing issues in many countries. In 1997 in the province of
Ontario, Canada, the government passed Bill 142, a Social
Assistance Reform Act, which included the Ontario Works Act,
1997, S.O.1997, Ch.25. While this legislation was controversial,
the most contentious provisions enabled the government’s welfare
agents to require that recipients submit to being fingerprinted

57

Supra, note 35, p.3.
Ibid., p.4.
59
PoliceOne.com, ‘Big Brother Always Watching in Britain, Where Surveillance
Cameras Are King,’ by Jane Wardell, The Associated Press, 13 August 2004, Online:
PoliceOne.com <http://www.policeone.com/policeone/frontend/parser.cfm>.
(Last accessed on 18 August 2004).
58
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before receiving any benefits.60 What was even more astounding
was the support that a similar program introduced by the City of
Toronto received from the provincial Information and Privacy
Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian. Cavoukian suggested that
because the encrypted fingerprint scans would be applied in a very
defined, narrow purpose and the potential risks to privacy had
been considered carefully in consultation with her office, the
threat to privacy would be acceptable.61
As discussed, in the intervening years since the introduction of
these programs, many other countries have either introduced
similar programs or are in the process of considering the use of
such technology to stop welfare fraud. The threat to individual
privacy through the implementation of these systems is palpable.
In terms of immigration and travel, biometric technology is being
introduced using a variety of techniques. According to a recent
news article, “the biggest revolution is in travel document. Soon
all new passports will contain a microchip holding at least one
biometric, probably two. The justification for this emanates from
the U.S., which in 2002 enacted legislation requiring all “visawaiver” countries (which includes the U.K.) to begin issuing
biometric passports by October 2004.”62 Apparently, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”) has
recommended facial recognition as the standard because, in their
view, it is the logical extension of the existing photograph.

60

Welfare Watch, ‘Welfare Reform: At What Human Cost?: Ontario Social Safety
NetWork,’ Online:
<www.welfarewatch.toronto.on.ca/wrkfrw/humanco.htm>.
(Last accessed on 18 August 2004).
61
Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy and Biometrics: An Oxymoron or Time to Take a 2nd
Look?’ Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, An Address Given by Ann
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However, each country is free to add a second biometric of their
choice.63
For frequent travellers who have been assessed as ‘low-risk’
travellers, the use biometrics in travel documents is claimed to
enable more efficient processing. Travellers will be able to “jump
queue and avoid through controls.”64
Asylum seekers in Europe are faced with the collection of their
fingerprints. In 1997, the European Council introduced the
‘Eurodac’ system, which created a centralized database of the
digitized fingerprints of every asylum seeker over the age of
fourteen years, as taken and submitted by every Member State.65
The stated purpose of Eurodac is “to establish the identity of
applicants for asylum and of persons apprehended in connection
with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the
community….it is also desirable…to allow each Member State to
check whether an alien found illegally present on its territory has
applied for asylum in another Member State.”66 It is believed that
this process will create greater efficiency in the processing of the
applications of asylum seekers within the European Community.
Another application of biometric technologies is the renewed
efforts by governments in the development of national
identification cards. Currently, several countries are exploring the
possibility of rolling out a national identity card to be used by all
citizens. These cards are believed to be capable of replacing the
need for other currently used documents like driver’s licences or
social security cards.
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According to the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest
Clinic (“CIPPIC”), a national ID card can be broadly defined as a
nationwide, all purpose identification document… It would likely
come in the form of a plastic card, with a computer chip
containing name, date, place of birth and gender of the bearer.
Possible additional information would be physical attributes, such
as height, eye colour, or other information like current address, a
sample signature, academic degrees or stage names.67 These cards
have the possibility of including biometric data, such as a
fingerprint or retinal pattern in the card.
Matar contends that the
Implementation of the card raises two fundamental issues:
security and privacy. The identification card can
significantly improve national security by providing
reliable verification, as well as a common denominator
through which agencies can cross-reference their
information. Standardized tamper-proof identification
cards used by citizens, residents and visitors containing
personal information about the cardholder would facilitate
68
this verification and the ability to create watch-lists.

Matar additionally asserts that the cards could also contain the
bearer’s biometric data while acknowledging that the inclusion of
this information would significantly invade the privacy of
Americans, as well as visitors. Matar asserts that “implementing a
national identification card in the United States for the purpose of
meeting our security goals need not cost us our privacy. A delicate
balance must be struck between security and privacy interests.”69
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National ID cards are currently in use in Belgium, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain. According to CIPPIC, “none of the
major common law countries (United States, Canada, U.K.,
Australia and New Zealand) has a national ID card regime.
However, like Canada, the U.K. is currently investigating possible
ways of introducing either voluntary or mandatory ID cards.”70 In
fact, in the U.K. the implementation of a national ID (aka
“entitlement”) card has been described as Home Secretary David
Blunkett’s “pet project.”71
In a recent article, David Blunkett was quoted as saying that he
was planning on “pushing on with plan for an ID card, with a draft
bill to hit Parliament within months. The ID card will contain
biometrics and may be in the wallets of UK citizens by 2007 at the
earliest. …the introduction is necessary to give the government
better control over immigration and prevent terrorists from using
multiple identities.72 Blunkett, who has been described as “an
enthusiastic advocate of the use of biometrics…,”73 had his plans
for the implementation of a compulsory ID card scuttled in
November 2003, when the Cabinet rejected his plan.74 Blunkett’s
recent comments indicate his determination to proceed with the
introduction of a biometric-based, national ID card in the UK with
due speed, despite the well-founded objections of opponents and
the fact that the technology remains unproven.
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There is no question that in the face of the new post-September
Eleventh reality governments are looking hard for some tool to
restore a sense of safety, security and order for their citizens.
Biometric technology is regarded by many as the solution. It
promises to authenticate and verify unknown individuals. It is
purported to prevent identity fraud, stop welfare cheats, identify
asylum seekers, and eliminate anonymity in transactions.
However, a review of the advantages and disadvantages of
biometric technology may provide a more balanced view by
allowing for examination beyond these immediate objectives

IV. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BIOMETRICS
As with other technologies, there are advantages and
disadvantages in the application of biometric technology for
purposes like security, social services entitlement, immigration,
travel and national identity cards. The rationale for examining
both the advantages and disadvantages is to determine who in fact
benefits from the implementation of these systems -the
government and the private sector, and whether there is any
benefit for the average person.
IV.1 ADVANTAGES
According to McCoy, “privacy advocates argue that facial
recognition technology is not cost effective because additional
security staff are required to run the software adequately. Contrary
to this argument, the implementation of facial-recognition
technology will not create the need to spend capital on more
security personnel. Instead, it will make the duties of existing
personnel more efficient.”75 McCoy contends that since the system
does the actual checking, looking for matches that are merely
verified by the human system operator, that additional staff are
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not required and as a result, there are greater efficiencies to be
realized by utilizing this type of biometric system.
However, human error in determining whether there is a match is
not a secure backstop on this system, instead, it is part of the
overall process with the facial recognition system, due to the
deficiencies of the technology. Since people often change their
appearances through age, weight gain or loss, illness, different
glasses or hairstyles which may be misinterpreted by the
technology, relying on a human to make such a determination has
a number of potentially negative consequences for the subject
person. Primarily, if the system indicates that there is a match, the
onus would then fall on the subject individual to disprove that the
image is theirs. Depending on the circumstance, this could lead to
embarrassment, and serious inconvenience such as missed flights
or denial of access. It is quite possible that additional security
personnel and more capital may indeed be required to deal with
false matches or rejects.
Matar suggests that national security in the context of preventing
terrorism requires database matching and reliable identification.
While the latter only refers to a “trustworthy identification with
which to track individuals,” the former requires the sharing of
information between police and government agencies, such as the
FBI, CIA and state police departments.76
Matar further alludes that a national security card, which utilizes
either a centralized or decentralized database, will result in the
greater sharing of information between these competing
organizations, leading to greater overall efficiency. This view
seems rather naïve. Since these organizations have historically had
great trouble sharing information or cooperating with each other
under regular law enforcement circumstances, it seems unlikely
that the introduction of new technology will suddenly foster a
new era of sharing and cooperation.
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Simon Davies points to the advantage of accurate identification of
individuals as a major benefit, which follows from the
implementation of a biometric technology system. Accordingly,
“the accurate identification of individuals is a key concern for
many Government agencies and corporations. It is important to
them because it contributes significantly to administrative
efficiency and the control of fraud, and can offer benefits to clients
as well.”77
In addition, Davies states that some of the declared “potential
benefits of an integrated biometrics-based identification system
include improvements in the cost of administration; the integrity
of identification; the integrity of information; access to
information; the speed of delivery of services and benefits; the
accuracy and quality of research; and the level of technical
security of communications.”78 However, Davies adds that where
these technologies are applied to a specific business or
administrative function within a particular organization, the
implementation is usually successful. Further, “the majority of
these success stories have in common a manageable size, a limited
geographic spread, a single purpose and modest and easily defined
goals. Where biometric technologies are applied to specific
purposes, some confidence may be felt in the system’s ability to
deliver the intended benefits. On the other hand, many failures
and disappointments continue to occur, even among seemingly
straightforward projects.”79
Some of the other suggested advantages achieved through the
implementation of biometric technology include: verification of
identity in a manner that is convenient, more accurate and secure
than exists with current methods, and the elimination of the
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reliance on passwords.80 It is likewise believed that the integration
of biometric technology into passports and Machine Readable
Travel Documents, as required by the new ICAO standard, will
lead to greater security as these identifications are considered to be
harder to falsify or tamper with.
Finally, some commentators believe that the use of biometric
technology will improve the “safety and security of every day
activities…which is of utmost importance to the general public
considering the recent terrorist attacks directed at the innocent
citizens of this country.”81 McCoy declares that “this technology
is necessary to prevent further terrorist attacks and it should not
be dismissed because of a mere potential for abuse when
precautions can be implemented.”82
McCoy concludes by dismissing opponents concerns about
the potential privacy violations through use of biometric systems
by averring that facial recognition technology does not violate
privacy rights because it is merely making a procedure currently
used by law enforcement more efficient. In McCoy’s estimation,
facial recognition technology is akin to matching faces to
pictures.83 Further, facial recognition technology is also similar to
fingerprinting, which has been used to identify perpetrators of
crimes for over a century…. fingerprinting is a law enforcement
procedure…if fingerprinting does not violate the constitution, then
neither should facial recognition technology.84
IV.2 DISADVANTAGES
The implementation of biometric technology does have some
potentially significant benefits in terms of the creation of tamper-
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proof documents which are not easily falsified; and the prevention
of fraud and identity theft by challenging the further use of
multiple identities. However, there are some very serious
problems with the technology, which raise grave concerns that
need to be addressed. To begin with, the potential for increased
surveillance and the threat to privacy are enormous.
In terms of surveillance, David Lyon states that one of the
responses that occurred following September Eleventh was the
extensive tightening of surveillance. The reactions can be
compared to
A prism that puts several things in perspective. One, it is
premature to see decentralized and commercial
surveillance simply supplanting nation-state power….
Two, reliance on high tech surveillance methods is
undaunted by the low-tech attacks or the failure of high
tech security systems already in place. While they may
not work to curb terrorism they are likely to impede civil
rights for citizens who will be even more profiled and
screened. Three, the struggle to make mushrooming
surveillance systems more democratically accountable and
amenable to ethical scrutiny is being set back by panic
85
regimes following September Eleventh.

Examples of increased surveillance include enlarged surveillance
of Internet activity, and public spaces by digital video cameras,
and the adoption of national identification cards embedded with
biometric information. At the same time, governments have
weakened traditional legal protections against unauthorized police
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searches and are increasingly turning to private sector databases to
access previously collected personal information.86
As a result, Lyon suggests that the type of social structure and
processes that are evolving as a consequence are an expanding
range of the already existing surveillance processes and practices
that circumscribe and shape our social existence, and the tendency
to rely on technological enhancements to surveillance systems
even when it is unclear that they work or address the problems
that they were intended to resolve.87 Post September Eleventh, “it
is safe to suggest that the intensity and the centralization of
surveillance in Western countries is increasing dramatically…such
systems once in place, are harder to dismantle than to install.”88
According to Lyon, high-tech companies that had been working to
develop new technology and waiting for an opportunity to launch
their new products, saw September Eleventh as providing just the
platform they needed.89 The problem is that while panicking
governments and populaces embraced this new technology, they
disregarded several unresolved issues.
These technologies may be tried but not tested. That is, it
is not clear that they work with the kind of precision that
is required and thus, may not achieve the ends intended.
Two, they are likely to have unintended consequences
that include reinforcing forms of social division and
exclusion within the countries where they are established.
Third, a larger dimension of the technological aspect of
surveillance practices is that seeking superior technologies
appears as the primary goal. No matter that the original
terrorism involved reliance on relatively aged technologies
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–jet aircraft of a type that had been around for 30 years,
sharp knives and so on –it is assumed that high tech
solutions are called for.
Moreover, the kinds of
technologies sought …rely heavily on the use of
searchable databases, with the aim of pre-empting acts of
90
terrorism by isolating in advance potential perpetrators.

What is clear is that the technology of today is enabling far-greater
surveillance, but is not up to the job of pre-empting terrorism or
other potentially nefarious behaviour. “Surveillance can only
anticipate up to a point, and in some very limited circumstances.
However, searchable databases and international communications
interception were fully operational on September 10, to no avail.
The likely result will be that internal surveillance of citizens by
the state will increase. And if ‘terrorists’ are apprehended it will be
by other means.”91 In the meantime, the public, particularly the
American public, appears ready to sacrifice their privacy and
permit government intrusions into their affairs in the name of
safety, security and routing out the “evil doers.”92
Biometric technology also poses a very serious threat to
privacy. Feldman asserts that “biometrics are merely a form of
data. Thus, collection of biometric data raises some of the same
issues that arise when government agencies or private firms
collect any information about citizens.”93 Further, there are two
specific issues that relate to the collection of biometric data.
“First, some commentators express concern that biometric data
could potentially reveal information about health status…second,
biometric technology raises for many people the spectre of
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government tracking.”94 The concern is that the collection of
biometric information will result in heightened monitoring of
individuals.
According to Cavoukian,
A fingerprint, and the broader family of biometrics…offer
irrefutable evidence of one’s identity since they are unique
biological characteristics which distinguish one person
from another, and which can only be linked to one
individual. An identifiable fingerprint can act as a
powerful unique identifier that can bring together
disparate pieces of personal information about an
individual. If used as a unique identifier, a fingerprint
enables individuals to be pinpointed and tracked. It also
creates the potential for personal information from
different sources to be linked together to form a detailed
profile about the individual unbeknownst to him or her.
This presents a clear invasion of privacy; one that most
95
people would object to.

Privacy is said to revolve “around the freedom of choice; without
the ability to exercise some reasonable sense of control over the
use of one’s information, privacy will become but a quaint
notion.”96 Matar adds that “privacy is one of the personal
attributes that most people innately cherish. We have an
instinctive desire to protect ourselves from being overly exposed.
We naturally seek to control who knows us personally, who may
get to know us well, and who has personal/private information
about us.”97
The sense is that with biometric technology, personal
information is gathered and stored easily and surreptitiously
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without the subject having control or knowledge. Further, and
most disconcertingly, the public has no idea who has access to the
information being gathered or how it will be used.
Some commentators suggest that “the benefits of implementing
facial-recognition technology are far more important than the
benefits of rights to privacy in public places.”98 They claim that
society is not willing to protect privacy at the price of risking their
safety.99 It has also been asserted that “society is not willing to
grant freedom from facial-recognition technology by allowing
individuals to have reasonable expectations of privacy in public
places. Facial recognition technology is the first step to the larger
solution of ending terrorist attacks and decreasing criminal
activity.”100
While the terrorist attacks undoubtedly shook the
American psyche to the core, and deeply affected the rest of the
world, there is an intense willingness to embrace any technology
that might offer even a scintilla of hope in preventing a repeat of
the horrors of September Eleventh. Unfortunately, this appears to
include a blind faith in untested biometric technology and an
eagerness to submit to public authorities and their agents, all of
the hard fought rights and freedoms of privacy, without any proof
that such a sacrifice is even justified. There is, after all, no
evidence that the technology is completely effective or that it
would be successful in stopping terrorists and other criminals.
However, reliance on unproven technology and the covert
collection of personal information might not be the biggest
problem with biometric technology. According to Cavoukian, “the
threat to privacy arises not from the positive identification that
biometrics provide, but the ability of third parties to access this in
identifiable form and link it to other information, resulting in
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secondary uses of that information, without the consent of the
data subject. This erodes the personal control of an individual over
the uses of his or her information.”101 Mallon adds that
The true privacy problems arise from third-party use of
…technology. The biggest concern stemming from third
party use is the potential for private citizens to develop
and maintain vast amounts of information on
individuals…. the fact that technology is giving private
individuals power to recall personal information with a
simple photograph raises concerns over the need to
regulate this new technology. Without restriction, there is
the potential for private use of face recognition technology
(and other biometrics) to cross the boundary from
102
providing security to invading privacy.

There are two problems which impact privacy that are illuminated
here. The first deals with the lack of accountability and potential
for abuse by government and the private sector that operate these
technologies; and the second pertains to the overarching need for
regulation and legislation to define the parameters in which these
groups should operate. Both of these will be discussed here briefly.
Feldman suggests that the “individual’s interest in ensuring the
accuracy and proper use of personal biometric information is
unlikely to be fully represented by other actors in the system.”103
Agre asserts that “the potential for abuse is astronomical.
Pervasive automatic face recognition could be used to track
individuals wherever they go. Systems operated by different
organizations could easily be networked to co-operate in tracking
an individual from place to place. This tracking information could
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be used for many purposes…. even more insidiously, tracking
information can be used to exert social control”104
In addition, claims by companies and government agencies that
their databases contain only wanted criminals raise other issues.
Agre states that “we have to trust your word that the only people
whose images are stored in the databases are wanted criminals,
and we have to trust your word that you throw away all images
that fail to match the database.”105 Agre also suggests that they
really have no idea whether all of the people in the database are
criminals as the quality control over these databases is far from
perfect. Finally, even if the only people in the database today are
criminals, the forces pushing down a slippery slope of everexpanding surveillance are nearly overwhelming.106
Some of the issues which do not appear to have been dealt with by
governments include who is permitted to collect information and
under what circumstances; who is permitted to have access to the
information and under what conditions; how are individuals able
to review their information and correct inaccuracies; what is the
process for people to challenge false rejects or claims that their
image matches one on the system; how are private sector
organizations who operate these systems on behalf of governments
to be controlled and forced to be accountable to the populace and
respectful of the national privacy laws. These are just some of the
issues that remain outstanding and require clarification through
legislation.
“Technology can introduce significant social changes while
escaping the “pattern of deliberation and review” that governs
social change. The problem is that inattention to technological
developments leads to an increased risk of unanticipated adverse
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social outcomes.”107 These risks include loss of privacy, loss of
governmental and private sector accountability, and eventually,
loss of democratic participation as people withdraw from the
overwhelming scrutiny.
It is noteworthy that “in contrast to laws that apply to
government, there have historically been far fewer common law or
legislative restraints on industry information gathering
practices…common law doctrine and statutory regimes have
historically offered fewer protections against private sector data
collection in part because non-governmental surveillance …does
not appear to erode democratic values.108 While the justification for
the collection of this data has traditionally been defended as
necessary in order to improve sales and marketing to customers,
there is currently limited regulatory guidance to specify what
information can be collected or whether these companies are
prevented from sharing or selling those biometric records to
others. This creates the danger of unscrupulous individuals or
unethical companies accessing the personal information over
which they have custody, in a nefarious manner that lends itself to
fraud, identity theft, or “function-creep,” which occurs when
personal information is used for a purpose not originally
intended.109
The unanimous consensus among commentators is that while the
biometrics industry is attempting to create guidelines in order to
self-regulate, “advocates of both privacy and facial recognition
technology believe that there are too many dangers associated
with these self-imposed guidelines, such as fraud and other illegal
uses of the technology.”110 Further, both groups agree that
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legislation is required to prevent misuse of the technology by
governmental agencies, corporations, or private citizens.111
According to McCoy, “the solution to the debate between privacy
and the need for adequate and effective security measures can be
resolved with appropriate legislation.”112 Further, “it is imperative
that legislation defines the scope broadly enough to ensure the
technology can be used effectively, but not so broad as to trample
upon reasonable expectations of privacy.”113 The position is that
detailed legislation will impact both law enforcement and citizens
positively by creating a broad scope for the implementation of
biometric technology while providing a focus on safeguarding
privacy.114
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the fact that
biometric technology is still developmental and evolving, and that
“regardless of how much we invest in establishing standards for
reliability of the technology and protections of the data from fraud
or improper use, no system will be fool proof. Biometric
determinations will be subject to mistakes, fraud, and abuse
through human and technological error, both intentional and
inadvertent.”115
In addition, Mallon asserts that
Recent studies have indicated a rather large percentage of
error in the new technology. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology…recently conducted a study to
measure the accuracy of face recognition systems.
According to the results, posed photos of a person taken
only eighteen months apart, were rejected by the system,
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which indicated no match approximately forty-three
percent of the time. An anticipated DOD study is expected
116
to confirm these statistics.

A recent article confirmed additional technology failures during
two separate tests conducted by the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) and a Japanese research group from the
University of Yokohama. The ACLU test discovered that facial
recognition technology failed to match the faces with the names of
503 out of 958 volunteers, while the Japanese group discovered
that fingerprints taken from drinking glasses could be replicated
by jelly moulds, circumventing the effectiveness of fingerprint
biometric technology.117
Lastly, Anthony Allan, Research Director with Gartner Research
speaking at the European Biometrics Forum in Dublin stated that
Even if sophisticated biometrics gear was in place in US
airports, the technology alone probably would not have
stopped the attacks. ‘They were legitimate travellers,’
th
referring to September 11 terrorists, ‘they weren’t known
as terrorists then, so they wouldn’t have appeared on
recognition systems.’ Indeed, Allan said that without
adequate back security measures and databases,
biometrics equipment is more or less useless…. biometrics
has proven to be fallible, with evidence available that has
shown that wearing glasses can fool an eye scanner,
prosthetic make-up can affect face scanners, a sore throat
can change a voiceprint and that breathing heavily on a
fingerprint
scanner
can
also
make
prints
118
unrecognizable.”
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During the same Forum, Kush Wadhwa, Director of Consulting
from the International Biometrics Group, tried to dispel the notion
that biometrics are the answer to world terrorism by asserting that
“biometrics is a system like any other. Biometrics is one aspect,
but one has to make sure all aspects of the system work.”119

V. CONCLUSION
Biometric technology and its applications either offer tremendous
opportunity in terms of increased security and safety, or a
significant threat to privacy and the right to be free from
unnecessary government intrusion into the daily affairs of the
citizenry. The position one takes depends clearly on their
viewpoint.
Proponents of this new technology believe that biometrics offer
the definitive solution to the current maladies that afflict our
societies: the on-going terrorist threat; social services and identity
theft; fraud; border security; controlling asylum seekers,
identifying illegal immigrants and eliminating anonymity from
online transactions. These are all legitimate objectives.
However, the proponents urgency for a renewed sense of
safety and security together with the blind adherence to all things
scientific, have prevented this group from acknowledging two
essential facts: first, biometric technology is under development
and in the midst of an evolutionary process. It is not foolproof,
remains untested in large, complex situations and has an
enormous error rate. Reliance on unproven technology to solve
such a wide array of problems without acknowledging the
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technology’s limits is dangerous, and in the case of the politicians
who continue to pursue biometrics as the ultimate remedy,
negligent.
Second, governments have historically had a difficult time using
personal information contained in databases under their
stewardship for only the purposes for which it was originally
intended. As Matar points out, “history has shown us government
officials have abused identification systems and databases in times
of crisis…. government has a track record of using its authority to
misuse the information with which it is provided in times of
crisis. During such times, acts of illegal immigration, imminent
threats of terrorism, and drug trafficking have trumped the
importance of our basic civil liberties and privacy rights.”120
Unfortunately, with biometric technology, this abuse may not be
limited strictly to times of exigency, but could easily become a
daily event, unbeknownst to the data subject. Government now
has the option of utilizing the post September Eleventh reduced
judicial scrutiny and relaxed legal requirements for monitoring
individuals and increasing surveillance without any of the
traditional privacy protections. Moreover, responses to privacy
advocates concerns can now be dismissed by raising the
“imminent terrorist threat” to quell objections to government
activities which violate national privacy laws.
The threat to personal privacy extends beyond governments to
their agents, private sector companies who are in the business of
developing biometric technology or collecting, storing and
maintaining personal information on behalf of their government
contracts. These third parties are currently operating with limited
legal legislation or regulations, and do not contend with the same
legal restrictions which apply to government bodies. They are
considerably dangerous to individual personal privacy and think
nothing of sharing information with other organizations or selling

120

Supra, note 49, p.10.
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private data to other groups, under the pretence that the
information belongs to them. Nuala O’Connor, Department of
Homeland Security Privacy Officer, recently conceded that several
American airlines had admitted to sharing massive amounts of
passenger data with government contractors.121 It is likely that this
admission is only the tip of the iceberg.
It is imperative that governments develop privacy
legislation and regulations that provide specific limits which
define how biometric information is to be collected and used, by
whom, and in what circumstances. Relying on existing legislation,
which was drafted in a different time and under different
conditions, when the application of biometric technology was not
even a possibility, are not suitable for trying to curb the activities
of governments and their agents in this new digital environment.
In addition, any anticipated legislation should provide clear
procedures for enabling citizens to verify and correct information
that pertains to them, and a process for challenging false rejects or
false positives when an individual is wrongly denied access on the
basis of a system error. Further, proposed legislation should also
include significant penalties for any individual or group, that is
determined to have inappropriately abused their fiduciary duty and
either used, accessed, shared or sold personal information without
the “unambiguous consent” of the individual. Until then,
biometric technology will not reach its full potential but will
instead become a tool of government social control aimed at the
very people it was intended to protect.
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